Introduction
This study uses quasi-experimental methods to examine the relationship between residential mobility and gentrification as a way of inferring the extent to which gentrification causes displacement. This approach is not without shortcomings, but it does shed light on the magnitude of an important potential outcome of gentrification-displacement 1 . To date much of the work on gentrification and displacement utilizing this approach has been limited to the US. As the context of residential mobility in the US differs substantially from other countries, findings based on US data may not be generalizable elsewhere. Our aim is to discern whether the US-based patterns of findings on gentrification and displacement utilizing quasiexperimental methods holds in a different context-England and Wales.
Previous Findings
Randomized experiments are often considered the 'gold standard' for identifying causal relationships, but randomly assigning households to the 'intervention' of gentrification is both impractical and inappropriate for studying such a contested and dynamic process. Thus, the use of quasi-experimental methods that include a counter-factual is a realistic option for measuring the relationship between gentrification and displacement. Early and a few contemporary (Van 1 Our analysis focuses exclusively on what Marcuse (1986) calls "direct last-resident displacement", which occurs when the resident is forced to leave their current residence. We feel this type of displacement deserves the most scrutiny because it likely causes the most harm.
Criekingen 2009) studies of displacement using succession and retrospective methodologies failed to include such a counter-factual (see Freeman (2005) for a detailed discussion of these approaches).
After these early displacement studies, transatlantic debates over displacement explored whether the working class and poor were being replaced rather than displaced in areas affected by long-term decline and/or the construction of new developments. Although the term gentrification was first coined in England and much theorizing on its causes and extent took place here, relative to the US, there was a paucity of empirical studies on displacement. In an important advance Atkinson (2000) used longitudinal individual-level data to examine the migration of gentrifiers and potential displacees, respectively, into and out of gentrifying neighborhoods. Atkinson found high rates of net outmigration from gentrifying areas among those who were inactive, the working class and the elderly, consistent with both direct displacement and exclusionary displacement. Because Atkinson did not measure mobility directly, however, we cannot as Atkinson concedes attribute the observed net migration patterns to direct or indirect displacement. Moreover, Atkinson's failure to control for other factors that contribute to residential mobility also limits our ability to infer whether the elevated migration rates among some groups in his study were due to gentrification or individual characteristics associated with mobility, such as the stage of the life cycle.
Several scholars focusing on the UK also provided a theoretical justification for how gentrification might occur without causing displacement. Hamnett and Whitelegg (2007, p. 122) describe gentrification occurring in London without having "…been accompanied by significant residential displacement as almost all the new housing units were in what were previously warehouses, industrial, or office buildings." Elsewhere Hamnett (Hamnett 2003, Butler and Hamnett 2009 ) describes how the professional classes in the UK are comprising an ever larger share of the population and are coming to replace, more so than displace, the working classes. Hamnett argues that as the working class shrinks and the professional class grows, it is to be expected that some of the neighborhoods inhabited by the working class would gentrify. This could occur without necessarily directly displacing poorer, working class households. While plausible, to our knowledge Hamnett's hypothesis has never been formally tested.
In the first decade of this century American scholars began to take advantage of increasingly available longitudinal microdata to measure the relationship between gentrification and displacement using quasi-experimental methods. The key contributions of this approach are the comparison of mobility or displacement levels in gentrifying and nongentrifying areas, and the inclusion of measures that control for characteristics other than gentrification (such as life cycle and housing characteristics) that influence mobility. Taken together, these features allow us to infer how much of the observed migration or displacement from gentrifying neighborhoods can be attributed to gentrification.
The evidence on gentrification and displacement from this body of work is mixed. Vigdor (2002) analyzed American Housing Survey (AHS) data to measure displacement from gentrifying zones of Boston between 1985 and 1993. Zones were classified as gentrifying based on the relative increase in the college-educated share of the population; the study also tested a more restrictive definition consisting of one central zone of the city. Using either definition, Vigdor found no evidence that households headed by someone without a postsecondary education were more likely to leave their units in gentrifying zones than elsewhere in the metropolitan area. Similarly, Freeman and Braconi (2004) analyzed New York City Housing and
Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) data from 1991-1999 to examine displacement from seven gentrifying sub-borough areas (SBAs). The classification was based on the authors' knowledge of local neighborhood change and supported by data documenting demographic and socioeconomic shifts consistent with gentrification. They found that poor households and those without a 4-year college education living in gentrifying SBAs were less likely to move compared to similar households elsewhere in the city.
Subsequent studies analyzed more fine-grained geographical units, limited the comparison group to low-income neighborhoods that were similar but for experiencing gentrification, and increased the generalizability of their findings by using nationally representative datasets. For example, Freeman's (2005) study of displacement from the mid1980s through the 1990s identified U.S. census tracts that were potential candidates for gentrification based on their central city location, median income relative to the metropolitan area, and housing stock age. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), he compared the likelihood of out-migration and displacement among residents of tracts that gentrified during the ensuing decade to residents of non-gentrifying tracts. When using an explicit measure of involuntary mobility (rather than overall mobility), this study did find higher rates of displacement in gentrifying neighborhoods, but this represented only a 1.4% probability of being displaced in gentrifying neighborhoods versus a 0.9% probability in non-gentrifying neighborhoods (Freeman 2005) . Moreover, Freeman's study failed to find consistently higher rates of mobility in gentrifying neighborhoods.
A subsequent study of U.S. Decennial Census data compared demographic shifts in lowincome census tracts that experienced large increases in average family income between 1990
and 2000 to comparable tracts that did not experience such an increase. The authors did not observe significantly higher out-migration rates of households with low education levels, whatever their racial background, from low-income neighborhoods classified as gentrifying (McKinnish, Walsh et al. 2010) . A similar analysis of the AHS from 1991 to 1999 found no evidence of higher mobility rates among U.S. renters or poor households in low-income census tracts that experienced large gains in average household income relative to the metropolitan area compared to similar households in non-gaining tracts (Ellen and O'Regan 2011) . Using a similar operationalization of gentrification, a study of PSID data from 1972 to 2003 found no consistent relationship between residence in a gentrifying tract and residential mobility ( (Vigdor 2002 , Freeman and Braconi 2004 , McKinnish, Walsh et al. 2010 , Ellen and O'Regan 2011 , Lee 2014 ).
Due to data constraints and the lack of conceptual consensus over what constitutes 'gentrification', 'displacement' or even 'neighborhood,' the constructs used in these studies are necessarily approximations of the phenomena of interest. For example, while census tracts are closer proxies for neighborhoods than the larger-scale units analyzed by Vigdor (2002) and Freeman and Braconi (2004) , their boundaries may still not be coterminous with those that residents identify with a particular neighborhood. Moreover, gentrification is a dynamic process that can occur gradually, unevenly, and over long periods of time; as discussed below, its effects on displacement may vary at different stages. This underscores the sensitivity of results to the time frame chosen (and available) for analysis. Moreover, operationalizations of gentrification vary. While some studies focus on rental inflation or tract-level income gains, others examine more explicit indicators of class such as increases in professionalization or college-educated population. The latter choice is often based on the observation that early stages of gentrification are characterized by influxes of college-educated but relatively low-paid professionals (see Freeman 2005 for a more detailed discussion of these issues).
One criticism of the aforementioned stuidies is their failure to capture households who move out of the study area or who become homeless, as Newman and Wyly found happens to residents in gentrifying neighborhoods in New York City (Newman and Wyly 2006) . This criticism is unfounded, however, as a household that was displaced and became homeless, doubled up or left the city would still be captured as having vacated their previous unit in such studies.
The notion that displacement is experienced in ways that are not captured by statistical surveys has also been advanced by studies of new-build gentrification in London, which describe how the in-migration of higher-income households impacts residents of adjacent neighborhoods through increased insecurity about housing prices and changes in neighborhood culture and amenities (Davidson and Lees 2005 , Davidson 2008 , Davidson and Lees 2010 .
These studies provide an important reminder that gentrification affects long-time residents even when, as is typical of new-build gentrification, reinvestment does not lead to direct displacement. However, this does not discount the utility of longitudinal microdata for measuring direct displacement where it does occur.
Another argument leveled by Slater (2009, p. 305) , is that "… low mobility is to be expected" in gentrifying neighborhoods, because rising prices make it difficult for low-income households to find housing elsewhere. Slater argues that it is in non-gentrifying poor areas where the rent gap is highest and the potential profit from displacing poor residents greatest;
consequently, mobility in these areas will be high as landlords disinvest and evict tenants in anticipation of incipent gentrification. A related argument holds more simply that including very poor neighborhoods in the control group of non-gentrifying neighborhoods sets a misleadingly high baseline for mobility because very poor renters move more frequently (Newman and Wyly 2006) . However, these depictions of low mobility rates in gentrifying neighborhoods and elevated mobility rates in non-gentrifying, poor neighborhoods appear inconsistent with Ellen and O'Regan (2011, p. 93), McKinnish et al. (McKinnish, Walsh et al. 2010) and Freeman (2005) finding no statistically significant differences in mobility between gentrifying and nongentrifying low-income neighborhoods once other controls for mobility are included.
A similar critique notes that displacement rates are likely to be higher during the early stages of gentrification, when those without the means to stay are pushed out. Consequently, studies that omit this time period will underestimate the incidence of gentrification-induced displacement. There is evidence that low-income households who remain in gentrifying neighborhoods after the initial waves of reinvestment are able to do so due to subsidies, rent regulations or personal coping strategies (such as enduring a higher rent burden) that are not realistic options for those who left (Newman and Wyly 2006) . As suggested in Slater's (2009) critique discussed above, those who remain in gentrifying neighborhoods may also do so because of a lack of accessible or affordable options elsewhere (Newman and Wyly 2006 , Wyly, Newman et al. 2010 , DeVerteuil 2011 , DeVerteuil 2012 quantitative studies compare gentrifying and non-gentrifying neighborhoods that were similarly disadvantaged at the beginning of the study period, they are likely to capture these early stages of gentrification, particularly since they test multiple specifications of gentrification.
Despite an expanding understanding of the multiple facets of displacement and the need for a variety of methodologies to understand them, the incidence of direct displacement remains a prominent concern in gentrification debates and longitudinal microdata continues to provide a unique tool for understanding this relationship. Because mobility rates are substantially higher in the US than in other advanced industrialized countries (Schachter 2004 , Seko and Sumita 2007 , David, Janiak et al. 2008 , the generalizability of the aforementioned studies beyond the US is questionable. Relatively high mobility rates in the US may make it difficult to distinguish the "signal" of displacement from the "noise" of normal residential turnover. In a setting where mobility rates are lower, such as England and Wales, displacement should be easier to discern. Despite being the home of the term gentrification and providing the raw material for some of the fiercest debates on the topic, the peer reviewed literature is devoid of quasi-experiemental methods for detecting displacement in gentrifying neighborhoods in England and Wales. This research tests whether the findings of US-based quasi-experimental studies of displacement in gentrifying neighborhoods are robust across the Atlantic.
Data
Data for this study were drawn from the British Household Panel Survey ( individuals who move after 1991 we can observe directly how long they resided at that address. The 2001 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 if a landlord in a gentrifying neighborhood raised a tenant's rent, the tenant might decide this is the impetus for moving in with a romantic partner or seeking a job in another city. While the rent increase motivated a major life choice that resulted in a move, if asked why they moved, the respondent might say "to move in with their partner" or "for a job", respectively.
For these reasons, we infer displacement indirectly by testing whether mobility rates are higher in gentrifying neighborhoods even after controlling for household level factors that have been found to predict mobility (Rossi 1980 , Owen and Green 1992 , Dieleman 2001 Whitehead 2013).
We use event history methods to analyze residential mobility in gentrifying and nongentrifying neighborhoods. The "event" of interest is whether someone moves. We are interested in how the neighborhood conditions (i.e. undergoing gentrification or not) at a specific point in time are related to the probability of moving at that time. While we will observe some moves by individuals over the course of the study period, some households will be in the midst of a residential spell whose termination will not be observed (i.e. right censored-spells). Event history methods allow us to include these spells in the analysis without arbitrarily assuming these individuals will never move. Because the BHPS collects data at discrete, annual intervals, we employ a discrete time logistic regression model. We use logistic regression because the outcome, to move or not, is a binary outcome that can be modelled 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 where P it is the probability of moving at time t for an individual with unvarying covariates X it (e.g. gender) and time-varying covariates W it (e.g. age). B 1 and B 2 are unknown parameters. In our discrete time framework the data is structured in person-year format where each individual is represented in the data equal to the number of years they were part of the BHPS. Having multiple observations from the same individual violates one of the assumptions made when conducting tests of statistical significance-independent observations. We estimate robust standard errors to be able to relax this assumption.
LLSOAs serve as proxies for neighborhoods in this analysis. Gentrification is conceptualized here as a class-based phenomenon whereby lower-status neighborhoods change to higher-status ones. Following Atkinson (2000) and Hamnett (2003) we base our measure of class and consequently gentrification on the degree of professionalization or whitecollar positions in a neighborhood. The "gentry" are those in the following National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) strata: higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations; large employers and higher managerial and administrative occupations, and lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations. As the UK deindustrializes, more people are employed in these occupations. The average representation in LLSOAs in these professional strata increased from 25.9% to 30.2% between 2001 and 2011.
Our measure of gentrification is hence a relative one. Two criteria were used to define a LLSOA as gentrifying. First, in 2001, the LLSOA had to have a representation of professionals that was below the median for all LLSOAs. This is our measure of relative disadvantage. Second, a LLSOA decline in deprivation and social housing than the non-gentrifying neighbourhoods. This pattern is starker for London than for the entire sample. These differences were statistically significant. This is consistent with a view of gentrification as a process of remaking poorer working-class neighbourhoods into more affluent spaces.
This process can be illustrated by examining some of the gentrifying areas shown in To assess whether gentrifying neighborhoods experience significantly elevated rates of direct displacement, this study models residential mobility to observe if there is a surfeit of mobility in these neighborhoods. Using the notion of a life-cycle to inform our model, we include measures for age, marital status, gender and the presence of children. Tenure has also been found to predict mobility, with owners substantially less likely to move (Rohe and Stewart 1996) . In the UK, residence in social housing has been associated with lower rates of mobility . Therefore both tenure and the type of rental are included as control variables. Finally, we use fixed effects to account for the respondent's local authority, which addresses local differences in housing context and problems that might arise from spatial autocorrelation. Because gentrification is a process that purportedly drives disadvantaged persons from their neighborhoods, we examine whether low-income or working-class individuals are particularly vulnerable to higher rates of gentrification-induced mobility by including an interactive term between residence in a gentrifying LLSOA and being low-income or workingclass, respectively. Low-income individuals were defined as those in the bottom quintile of the income distribution in a given year. Working-class individuals were defined as those whose latest job was in one of the following occupations: personal service work, foreman manual, skilled manual workers, semi-skilled manual workers, unskilled manual workers, own account workers, agricultural workers and members of armed forces. Finally, we also model the hazard rate, or the probability that an individual will move in a given year. Approximately eight percent (nine percent in London) of the sample move in a given year. This figure, at least 50% lower than estimates of residential mobility in the US (Schachter 2004 , Freeman 2005 , confirms that England and Wales are an appropriate context to test whether lower rates of residential mobility will make it easier to detect the signal of displacement from the noise of residential turnover.
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
In sum, our approach is to use event history methods to model how likely individuals are to move in gentrifying neighborhoods compared to other disadvantaged neighborhoods that do not gentrify using life-cycle and housing context factors as statistical controls. We use the presence or extent of gentrification as a predictor of residential mobility in that year. We also 
Results
In the interest of brevity we present the full regression model for only two specifications and discuss the full results of only one model. Table three types of housing are more likely to move, relative to owners. For the full sample, the difference in mobility rates between council homes residents and owners is the smallest and is not statistically significant. For the London-only sample council tenants have lower rates of mobility than owners, as suggested in previous research . The categorical variables indicating the length of time since the individual last moved are all less than one, meaning that the later in a residence spell we observe an individual, the lower the probability they will move. Although the focus of this paper is not on modelling residential mobility per se, the intuitive appeal of the model enhances its credibility. regression results for the entire sample. The main independent variables of interest are residence in a gentrifying neighborhood and the interaction between residence in a gentrifying neighborhood and being low-income. If residence in a gentrifying neighborhood (the reference category) is associated with a higher probability of mobility, we should observe an odds ratio that is statistically significant and less than one for residence in a disadvantaged, nongentrifying neighborhood. If low-income households are susceptible to higher rates of mobility in gentrifying neighborhoods, we should observe an odds ratio that is statistically significant and less than one for the interaction between being low-income and residence in a nongentrifying neighborhood. Alas, neither of these patterns are in evidence. For the full sample, the odds ratio for non-gentrifying disadvantaged neighborhoods is greater than one, which would mean mobility was higher in these neighborhoods than gentrifying neighborhoods, but this result is not statistically significant. Moreover, the interaction terms between low-income status and residence in a non-gentrifying neighborhood, and being working-class and residence in a non-gentrifying neighborhood, are not statistically significant. For the full sample, there is no evidence that mobility rates are higher in gentrifying neighborhoods or that low-income or working-class individuals are more susceptible to moving from gentrifying neighborhoods.
The fourth and fifth columns of Table Three An alternative way of interpreting the interaction terms discussed above is presented in Figure Two , which shows the predicted probabilities of moving for poor and working-class individuals residing in gentrifying, non-gentrifying and advantaged neighborhoods. In the full sample, the probability of moving varies little across the different types of neighborhoods. In London, however, the probability of moving is higher for low-income individuals in gentrifying neighbourhoods, and lower for working-class individuals in gentrifying neighborhoods, than comparable individuals in non-gentrifying neighborhoods. These differences, which were tested using a different statistical test than that used for the regression coefficients presented in Table   three , are not statistically significant. The only statistically significant difference in Figure Two 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 for the predicted probability of moving between working class individuals in advantaged neighborhoods in London and working class individuals in gentrifying neighborhoods in London.
FIGURE TWO
Overall, our results thus far provide mixed support for the thesis that gentrification leads to direct displacement. For the entire sample there is no evidence that direct displacement is associated with neighbourhoods that are gentrifying. In London, however, there is evidence consistent with the lowest-income individuals being displaced.
To adjudicate among the conflicting results, we estimate the relationship between gentrification and mobility using alternative specifications. While the intuition behind gentrification leading to direct displacement is clear, as discussed above the precise functional form of this relationship is less certain. For example, we may be defining the gentry too broadly or demarcating gentrifying from non-gentrifying incorrectly. If patterns persist across alternative specifications this would inspire a degree of confidence in the results.
Robustness Tests
The alternative specifications we attempted included: 1. Operationalizing gentrification as the change in the absolute number of gentrifiers moving into a LLSOA. This approach relieves us of having to arbitrarily demarcate gentrifying from non-gentrifying LLSOAs. 2. Instead of defining gentrification as an increase in professionalization at the 75 th percentile or above for all LLSOAs, we used a more inclusive threshold of the 50 th percentile or above. 3. We tested 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 whether renters were especially susceptible to elevated rates of mobility in gentrifying neighborhoods. 4. We defined the gentry more stringently to include only those with at least Level 4 (Level 4/5 in 2001 census) qualifications, that is, with a university degree, postgraduate degree or professional qualifications (e.g. Accountant, Nurse, Teacher). For all of these tests we estimated separate models for the entire sample and London. For robustness tests 1, 2 and 4
we estimated separate models for low-income and working-class individuals, respectively.
These alternative specifications did not produce any other statistically significant results.
Indeed, the finding that low-income individuals were more likely to move from gentrifying neighborhoods in London did not prove robust across alternative specifications.
Discussion
This study tested whether quasi-experimental methods would detect direct displacement amidst residential turnover in gentrifying neighborhoods in England and Wales, where mobility rates are lower than the US. Evidence of elevated mobility among low-income households in gentrifying neighborhoods was found in only one specification and only for the London sample . The results presented here are thus for the most part inconsistent with the notion that gentrification leads to widespread direct displacement that manifests in higher mobility rates among residents of gentrifying neighborhoods.
This result, and those from similar studies discussed above, seems to defy common sense. While this study has similar limitations to previous ones, as it utilizes a survey that was not explicitly designed to measure displacement and must rely on indirect operationalizations 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 of the key concepts involved, the above-mentioned critiques of this literature do not adequately explain why this study failed to detect elevated mobility rates out of gentrifying neighborhoods. Our analysis compares gentrifying and non-gentrifying neighborhoods that
were similarly disadvantaged at the start of the study, and is therefore likely to capture the early stages of gentrification when many have posited displacement levels are highest. Due to the difficulty of operationalizing the concepts involved, this study tested multiple specifications of gentrification and examined displacement rates for low-income and working-class individuals. There was also little evidence of lower mobility rates among low-income households in gentrifying neighborhoods versus non-gentrifying neighborhoods, as Slater (2009p. 305 ) and others assert is likely to be the case.
Yet anecdotal reports of direct displacement from gentrifying neighborhoods abound.
Documentaries and news articles have detailed the experiences of people struggling with rising housing costs in gentrifying neighborhoods, including those identified in our study (Padilla 2014) . One tenant of a council estate targetted for regeneration in the East London borough of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Although existing critiques fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of this incongruence, the observations made by Slater (2009) and others that mobility rates among low-income households are relatively high is correct. Moreover, it is certain segments of the low-income-the young, private renters, those in unregulated housing -who have the highest mobility and are most vulnerable to displacement. For example, one report found that in Tower
Hamlets, Newham and Hackney 'a subset of households in the private rented sector or without secure accommodation are particularly highly mobile to the point that they might be called transient' (Scanlon, Travers et al. 2007) . Finally, there is also some evidence that both lowincome and non-low-income residents of poor neighborhoods exit these neighborhoods more quickly than other types of neighborhoods, and that renters are more likely to stay put in neighborhoods with rising rates of owner occupancy (Quillian 1999 , Quillian 2003 , Lee 2014 . In societies where so much of what makes a neighborhood desirable (e.g. crime, good schools, shopping choices) is commodified or based on one's ability to pay, people may be more likely to want to "stay put" in neighborhoods where the socioeconomic status and concomitantly desirability is increasing (Parkes and Kearns 2003; Permentier , van Ham and Bolt 2009) .
Putting all of this together, one possible explanation for the incongruence between quasi-experimental results and anecdotal reports might be: A relatively poor neighborhood that has experienced disinvestment will likely have above average mobility rates. This is because the poor move more frequently, renting (which is associated with higher mobility) is more common in poorer areas, and some residents will move to seek greener pastures. An influx of more affluent people and investment may occur to fill the vaccum, which is how gentrification occurs.
Indeed, for the overall sample and for the London-only sample, a higher proportion of in-movers to gentrifying than non-gentrifying neighborhoods had college degrees. This pattern was most marked in London, where 64% of in-movers to gentrifying neighborhoods had college degrees, compared to 27% of in-movers to disadvantaged, non-gentrifying neighborhoods.
Moreover, it may be the relatively high rates of turnover in some poorer neighborhoods that allows gentrifiers to gain a foothold. As the neighborhood gentrifies, some original residents who might otherwise have left may decide to stay put because of improved amenities in the neighborhood. Others who wish to leave may remain because of a lack of options elsewhere. Others may not like the changes and may move, and some will be directly displaced.
However, the decrease in normal turnover rate and the increase of displacement counteract each other. From a view of 10,000 feet, therefore, the overall amount of residential turnover may appear to be little different from what was occurring prior to gentrification or what is occurring in non-gentrifying neighborhoods. These findings should therefore not be intepreted as meaning that displacement does not occur in gentrifying neighborhoods.
While quasi-experimental methods remain useful for examining gentrification and displacement on a broad scale, they do not give us a complete picture of the people, places and processes involved. There is thus a continuing need for in-depth studies of particular places to understand how neighborhood change occurs and is experienced. On the ground, the challenge for those concerned about equitable outcomes in the face of gentrification is to identify the circumstances under which displacement occurs and to take steps to prevent it. Exclusionary 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
